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ONLY PARTIALLY COLOR-BLIND:
JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN'S VIEW OF
RACE AND THE CONSTITUTION
t
Earl M. Maltz

INTRODUCTION

As the one-hundredth anniversary of Plessy v. Ferguson'
approaches, one can expect an outpouring of admiration for
Justice John Marshall Harlan. Virtually all discussions of the
constitutional status of race relations prominently feature
Harlan's dissent in Plessy.2 Based largely on this dissent, Harlan
has become a kind of constitutional icon, with many modern
scholars lavishly praising him as a man whose advocacy of the
"color-blind Constitution" stood in sharp contrast to his racist
colleagues on the Fuller Court and prefigured modern
constitutional theories dealing with race discrimination.3
This Essay places the Plessy opinion in the context of Harlan's
overall record on race-related cases, and contends that such
characterizations dramatically overstate Harlan's commitment to
racial equality. Admittedly, he was less willing than other
members of the Waite and Fuller Courts to countenance state
action that denied rights to African-Americans. Conversely, he
was less hostile to federal statutes that were designed to protect
the rights of the freed slaves. However, even in this area, his
commitment to racial equality was less robust than is often
suggested. Moreover, in cases involving the rights of NativeAmericans and Chinese immigrants, Harlan showed even less

t Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers (Camden). The Author gratefully
acknowledges the assistance of Charles McClain, who read an earlier draft of this
Essay and made a number of helpful suggestions.
1. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
2. E.g., DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 115-16 (3d ed. 1992);
ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 118-30 (1992); DONALD E. LIVELY,
THE CONSTITUTION AND RACE 52-53 (1992); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1524-25 (2d ed. 1988).
3. E.g., KULL, supra note 2, at 118-30; CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A
LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 195 (1987).
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sympathy for the plight of racial minorities in a Eurocentric
society.
I.

HARLAN'S ROAD TO THE COURT

John Marshall Harlan was born in Kentucky on June 1, 1833.
Harlan's early life and political career gave little clue that he
would ultimately emerge as a champion of the rights of free
blacks on the Court.4 A slaveowner himself until shortly before
the Civil War, he opposed the adoption of the Thirteenth
Amendment and did not join the Republican Party until the
process of Reconstruction was well under way. As a Republican,
he reversed course, strongly defending not only the Thirteenth
but also the Fourteenth Amendment. This course of action did
not bring Harlan success in statewide elections; nonetheless, it
brought him substantial notoriety in national Republican politics.
Thus, when President Rutherford B. Hayes determined to
appoint a southerner to replace retiring Justice David Davis in
1877, Harlan was a logical choice. Harlan's jurisprudence
reflected a staunch nationalism and strong respect for property
rights; however, he is best remembered for his actions in cases
involving the rights of free blacks.
A.

Harlan and the Rights of Free Blacks

Although Harlan is best known for his dissenting opinions in
cases involving the rights of free blacks, the first major decisions
in which he participated-the jury discrimination cases-actually
found him in agreement with the majority of the Court.5 Two of
these cases, Ex Parte Virginia' and Strauder v. West Virginia,7
presented constitutional challenges to efforts to require states to
allow blacks to serve on juries. Ex Parte Virginia involved a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus from a state judge indicted
for allegedly violating the Civil Rights Act of 1875 by

4. LOREN P. BETH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: THE LAST WHIG JUSTICE (1992) and
TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, JUDICIAL ENIGMA: THE FIRST JUSTICE HARLAN (1995) discuss
Harlan's early life in detail.
5. The discussion of the jury discrimination cases is taken from Earl M. Maltz,
The Civil Rights Act and the Civil Rights Cases-Congress, Court and Constitution, 44
FLA. L. REV. 605, 628-32 (1992).
6. 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
7. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
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systematically excluding blacks from jury lists that he prepared.8
The case raised two analytically distinct problems of federal-state
relations. The first was the substantive question of whether the
federal government could constitutionally require the states to
allow blacks to serve on juries.9 The second was the institutional
question of whether federal law could punish a state official for
performance of the duties required of him by state law. 10
The majority opinion in Ex Parte Virginia focused primarily on
the nationalizing impact of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Speaking for the Court, Justice William Strong asserted that
"[the Reconstruction Amendments] were intended to be, what
they really are, limitations of the power of the States and
enlargements of the power of Congress,"" and that enforcement
of the rights guaranteed by the amendments "is no invasion of
State sovereignty." 2 While conceding "in the general" that "the
selection of jurors for her courts and the administration of her
laws belong to each State,"' 3 Strong found justification for the
Civil Rights Act of 1875 in the flip-side of American
federalism-the principle that "in exercising her rights, a State
cannot disregard the limitations which the Federal Constitution
has applied to her power."' 4 Turning to the institutional concern
with federal coercion of state officials, Strong contended:
A State acts by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial
authorities. It can act in no other way. The constitutional
provision, therefore, must mean that no agency of the State,
or of the officers or agents by whom its powers are exerted,
shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.'
He concluded, therefore, that Congress must have authority to
who violate the principles of
impose penalties on those officials
16
the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Strauder, Strong focused more specifically on the
relationship between jury selection and the Equal Protection

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Ex
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 340.
at 344-48.
at 348-49.
at 345.
at 346.

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 347.
16. Id. at 348.
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Clause. Strauder dealt with a statute derived from the Civil
Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870, which provided for removal of
state court actions to federal court by defendants who would be
denied or could not enforce a right secured to them by a "law
providing for... equal civil rights.""7 In the trial, Strauder, a
West Virginia black man, was accused of killing his wife.18
Under West Virginia state law, only whites were allowed to serve
on juries." The defendant claimed that this exclusion was
inconsistent with both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the
Fourteenth Amendment, and that he was therefore entitled to
the benefit of the removal provision." The state court denied his
motion, and Strauder was convicted of murder.2 ' He argued that
the state court's refusal to remove the case to federal court
vitiated his conviction.22
Concluding that the case should have been removed, Strong's
reasoning tracked the arguments of those who had supported the
inclusion of the jury discrimination provision in the Civil Rights
Act of 1875. He first contended:
The very fact that [black] people are singled out and
expressly denied by a statute all right to participate in the
administration of the law, as jurors... is practically a brand
upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their
inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an
impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal
justice which the law aims to secure to all others.'
Strong also asserted that the statute denied equal protection to
black defendants themselves, contending:
It is not easy to comprehend how it can be said that while
every white man is entitled to a trial by a jury selected from
persons of his own race or color, or, rather, selected without
discrimination against his color, and a negro is not, the latter
is equally protected by the law with the former.24

17. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 311 (1879).

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

504.
305, 310-12.
304.
304-05.
308.
309.
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Harlan's votes in Ex Parte Virginia and Strauder are certainly
consistent with his image as a champion of racial justice;
however, his action in the companion case of Virginia v. Rives'
is more problematic from this perspective. Like Strauder, Rives
challenged the refusal of a state court to grant a petition for
removal that was based upon a claim that blacks were
improperly excluded from a jury in a criminal case.26 In Rives,
however, the relevant state statutes did not prohibit blacks from
serving on juries; instead, the gravamen of the defendant's claim
was that the presiding judge made an independent decision to
limit 7 jury service to whites, in direct contravention of state
law.

2

The disposition of Rives was strongly influenced by the
reformulation of the Removal Statute during the compilation
project that culminated in the passage of the Revised Statutes of
1875.' In theory, the purpose of the compilation was only to
systematize and clarify existing law; the compilers were not to
make substantive changes. However, the compilers inexplicably
made a major change in the removal provision. As initially
formulated in 1866, the provision incorporated by reference the
procedures of the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act of 1863, which
in turn allowed both pre-trial and post-judgment removal-a
point clearly reflected in the only systematic exposition of the
removal process by Senator Lyman Trumbull, the drafter of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.29 However, the Revised Statutes
provided only for pre-trial removal."0 Against this background,
the Court unanimously held that removal was not available in
Rives.31
Once again speaking for the united Republican majority,32
including Harlan, Strong noted that the Removal Statute
required a defendant to demonstrate before trial that he was
unable to enforce his "equal civil rights" in the judicial tribunals
of the state. 3 He argued that where, as in Rives, state statutes

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

100 U.S. 313 (1879).
Id. at 315-16.
Id. at 314-16.
See, e.g., id. at 316-17.
See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1759 (1866).
See Rives, 100 U.S. at 318-19.
Id. at 322-24.
Id at 314-24.
Id. at 318-19.
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forbade discrimination against blacks, one should presume that
the defendant could vindicate his rights in either the state trial
courts or the state appellate courts.34 Thus, he concluded, in
those cases, removal to federal court should not be available.35
Some commentators have suggested that Rives is best
understood as a reflection of the Justices' willingness to sacrifice
the interests of blacks in order to reinforce both the political
settlement of 1877 and the traditional structure of federalism. 0
As Benno C. Schmidt has persuasively argued, such contentions
are probably overstated. 7 Nonetheless, Harlan's willingness to
concur in Rives stands as a rejection of a facially plausible
interpretation that would have greatly advanced the interests of
free blacks. Of course, the case did not have any direct
implications for constitutional doctrine; however, at the very
least, it suggests that Harlan was willing to sacrifice the
interests of racial justice to conventions of legal interpretation.
Indeed, in subsequent years, Harlan would be the author of a
number of important opinions that relied on principles of
statutory interpretation to limit the scope of removal jurisdiction
in cases that raised Strauder-type issues.38
Three years after the jury discrimination decisions, the Civil
Rights Cases 9 provided the occasion for the decisive break
between Harlan and his Republican brethren on the Waite Court.
These cases arose from criminal charges against the owners of
two hotels and two theatres, respectively, and a civil action
against a railroad company. In each case, the gravamen of the
allegations was that a patron had been discriminated against on
the basis of his race, and that the discrimination violated the
Civil Rights Act of 1875.40
Speaking for the Court, Justice Joseph P. Bradley treated the
owners of the facilities as indistinguishable from other private
parties. Bradley did not expressly reject the theory that access to

34. Id. at 320-22.
35. Id. at 322.
36. E.g., HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW:
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1835-1875, at 494-95 (1982).
37. Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Juries, Jurisdiction,and Race Discrimination:The Lost
Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEx. L. REV. 1401, 1433-40 (1983).
38. E.g., Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S.
110 (1882).
39. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
40. Id. at 4-8.
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common carriers, inns, and places of amusement was a basic civil
right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.4 Indeed, one
part of his argument conceded the possibility that the Fourteenth
Amendment guaranteed such access, and that Congress could
require states to enforce the rights of blacks in this regard."
However, Bradley concluded that Congress lacked authority to
act directly against the owners of the facilities themselves.' In
part, this conclusion rested on a formal argument about the
nature of rights themselves:
[C]ivil rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution
against State aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful
acts of individuals, unsupported by State authority in the
shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings.
The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any such
authority, is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that
individual; an invasion of the rights of the injured party, it is
true, ... but if not sanctioned in some way by the State, or

not done under State authority, his rights remain in full
force, and may presumably be vindicated by resort to the
laws of the State for redress."
Bradley bolstered this argument with an appeal to the basic
concept of federalism, contending that a contrary position would
allow Congress to "establish a code of municipal law regulative of
all private rights between man and man in society. It would be to
make Congress take the place of the State legislatures and to
supersede them."4"
Harlan's dissent brought together three themes that would
consistently recur in his race-related jurisprudence. The first was
a judicial nationalism that manifested itself in a broad definition
of the powers of Congress.' The second was a recognition that
the freed slaves occupied a special place in constitutional
analysis.47 The third was a relatively broad definition of
fundamental rights.' Each of these factors played an important
role in his argument.
41. Id. at 9-10.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at

10-11.
10-13.
17.
13.
26-62.
32-36.
44-62.
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Harlan contended that the challenged provisions of the Civil
Rights Act were defensible under the enforcement clauses of both
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.4 9 He began his
analysis by emphasizing the need to defer to congressional
judgment in most cases:
Whether the legislative department of the government has
transcended the limits of its constitutional powers, "is at all
times... a question of much delicacy, which ought seldom, if
ever, to be decided in the a1fnrmative, in a doubtful case....
The opposition between the Constitution and the law should
be such that the judge feels a clear and strong conviction of
their incompatibility with each other." . . .Every possible

presumption is in favor of the validity of a statute, and this
continues until the contrary is shown beyond a rational
doubt."'
Later in the opinion, he invoked Chief Justice Marshall's famous
language in McCulloch v. Maryland5 to support this view:
The sound construction of the Constitution... must allow to
the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the
means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into
execution, which will enable that body to perform the high
duties assigned to it in the manner most beneficial to the
people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of
the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are
constitutional.52
From this starting point, Harlan deployed Prigg v.
Pennsylvania" against Bradley's argument that, even assuming
that the rights protected by the Civil Rights Act were themselves
guaranteed by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments,
Congress could not act against private individuals who interfered
with the ability of the freed slaves to enjoy those rights. 4

49. Id. at 26-62.
50. Id. at 27-28 (quoting Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87, 128 (1810) and
The Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718 (1878)).
51. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
52. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 51 (1883) (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) at 421).
53. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
54. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 34-37.
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Ironically, in relevant part, Prigg was a challenge to the
constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, which
prohibited private parties from interfering with the apprehension
of fugitive slaves.5 5 The source of authority for the statute was
Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution, which contains no
specific enforcement language, but provides simply that "[nlo
Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law
or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or
Labour, but shall [be returned to the master]." 5 In rejecting the
claim that Congress possessed no power to pass the Fugitive
Slave Act, Justice Joseph Story declared:
The fundamental principle applicable to all cases of this sort,
would seem to be, that where the end is required, the means
are given; and where the duty is enjoined, the ability to
perform it is contemplated to exist on the part of the
functionaries to whom it is intrusted.
... It would be a strange anomaly, and forced
construction, to suppose that the national government meant
to rely for the due fulfillment of its own proper duties and
the rights which it intended to secure, upon state legislation;
and not upon that of the Union.57
Harlan noted that, like the Fugitive Slave Clause at issue in
Prigg, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments by their
terms each provided constitutional protection for specific rights
and prohibited state interference with those rights.5" In
addition, he noted that the argument for congressional control
over private action was much stronger in the Civil Rights Cases
because, unlike the Fugitive Slave Clause, the Reconstruction
Amendments expressly provided Congress with enforcement
authority.59 Thus, focusing specifically on the Thirteenth
Amendment, he argued:
We have seen that the power of Congress, by legislation, to
enforce the master's right to have his slave delivered up on

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 616-19.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, c. 3.
Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 615, 623.
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26-28 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 28-37.
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claim was implied from the recognition of that right in the
national Constitution.... [More generally, t]his court has
uniformly held that the national government has the power,
whether expressly given or not, to secure and protect rights
conferred or guaranteed by the Constitution. That doctrine
ought not now to be abandoned, when the inquiry is not as to
an implied power to protect the master's rights, but what
may Congress, under powers expressly granted, do for the
protection of freedom, and the rights necessarily inhering in
a state of freedom."
Having concluded that Congress possessed constitutional
authority to criminalize private interference with the exercise of
rights guaranteed by the Reconstruction Amendments, Harlan
next turned to a definition of those rights. He made two separate
but related arguments, contending first that the Civil Rights Act
was founded on the congressional authority to strike at the
"badges" and "incidents" of slavery under the Thirteenth
Amendment,"' and second that the statute was authorized by
the analogous power to protect the rights guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 2 The basic concepts underlying the
two arguments were strikingly similar. Harlan juxtaposed both
amendments to the decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford," and
emphasized the fact that they were primarily designed to
ameliorate the condition of blacks in America.6 4 Thus, while
recognizing that "[t]he terms of the Thirteenth Amendment are
absolute and universal,"" Harlan also noted:
[I]t is historically true that that amendment was suggested
by the condition, in this country, of that race which had been
declared, by this court [in Dred Scott] to have had-according
to the opinion entertained by the most civilized portion of the
white race, at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution--"no rights which the white man was bound to
respect.... .66

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 33-34 (citation omitted).
Id. at 35-43.
Id. at 43-59.
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 30-37 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 33.
Id.
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Conversely, Harlan noted that the citizenship clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment "introduced all of that race, whose
ancestors had been imported and sold as slaves, at once, into the
political community known as the 'People of the United

States.'

)27

Harlan also saw the specific rights established by the two
amendments as largely congruent. He argued that the Thirteenth
Amendment protected such civil rights as were fundamental to
freedom, which he associated with "the privileges or immunities
secured by [the Constitution] to citizens of the United States."68
Similarly, his Fourteenth Amendment argument rested on the
view that Section 1 had constitutionalized rights "which are
69 fundamental in citizenship in a free republican government" those which were protected by the privileges and immunities
clause of Article IV, Section 2.70
Against this background, Harlan had little trouble in
upholding the congressional ban on segregation of public
conveyances and inns. He emphasized the special status of both
public conveyances and inns at common law, as well as the
authorities that characterized the right of access to these
facilities as an inherent part of the fundamental right to
"personal locomotion."7 1
Harlan conceded that application of the Civil Rights Act to
places of public amusement posed a somewhat more difficult
problem. As he noted, these facilities stood on a somewhat
different footing at common law." Nonetheless, relying on Munn
v. Illinois,73 he asserted that, because these institutions were
"established and maintained under direct license of law" they
were "affected with a public interest."74 For this reason, in
Harlan's view, Congress had the power to prohibit places of
amusement from discriminating on the basis of race." He
reasoned that to hold otherwise would be to allow state
governments to "discriminate or authorize discrimination against

67. Id. at 46.
68. Id. at 33.
69. Id. at 47.
70. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 37-41 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 41-43.
94 U.S. 113 (1876).
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 41-42 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id at 41-42.
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a particular race, solely because of its former condition of
servitude." 76 By linking federal power to the licensing authority,
Harlan was able to uphold the statute, while at the same time
avoiding the most radical theories of congressional power over
private action, which would have authorized regulation of even
purely private commercial activity.
The pattern of the Civil Rights Cases would be consistently
repeated during Harlan's tenure on the Court. The majority of
the Court would vote to strike down statutes designed to protect
the rights of the freed slaves, and Harlan would dissent-often
alone. 7 In other race-related contexts, however, Harlan played a
more ambiguous role.
II.

THE ROAD TO PLESSY

5 would be the culmination of the debate
Plessy v. Ferguson"
over the constitutional status of public transportation that began
with the Civil Rights Cases. Obviously, Bradley's opinion in that
case dealt a severe blow to efforts to desegregate the nation's
transportation system. However, the Civil Rights Cases at least
strongly implied that any attempt by states to require segregation in these facilities would still be held unconstitutional. In
fact, Hall v. DeCuir7 9-- a case decided before Harlan came to the
Court-seemed to suggest that, at least in some circumstances,
any such state mandate would face severe constitutional difficulties beyond those posed by the Reconstruction Amendments
themselves.
Hall did not involve a state statute requiring carriers to
provide separate facilities for the races; instead, it was a
challenge to a Louisiana statute that forbade racial segregation
by those transporting passengers within the state."0 A
Fourteenth Amendment challenge to this statute was almost
unthinkable; instead, the owner of a steamboat engaged in
interstate traffic argued that the state requirement ran afoul of

76. Id. at 41.
77. E.g., Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(arguing Congress may constitutionally prohibit private interferences with basic
rights); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing,
without written opinion but by inference, Congress may constitutionally prohibit
private, racially motivated interference with the right to vote).
78. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
79. 95 U.S. 485 (1877).
80. Id. at 485-86.
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the dormant commerce clause. In unanimously striking down the
statute, the Court characterized the requirement as a "direct
burden upon inter-state commerce,"8 ' arguing that "[wihile [the
statute] purports only to control the carrier when engaged within
the State, it must necessarily influence his conduct to some
extent in the management of his business throughout his entire
voyage." 2 Noting the difficulties that might arise if other states
in which the steamboat operated passed statutes requiring
segregation, the Court concluded that "[c]ommerce cannot
flourish in the midst of such embarrassments,"8 3 and that
"[u]niformity in the regulations by which [the interstate traffic in
passengers] is to be governed ... is a necessity... and to secure
it Congress, which is untrammelled by State lines, has been
invested with the exclusive legislative power of determining what
such regulations shall be.""
This analysis, consistent with other dormant commerce clause
decisions of the same era, clearly implied that no state could
adopt any regulation which either required or prohibited racial
segregation by interstate carriers. The race-related nature of the
regulation was not, however, critical to the decision. Instead, the
Court analogized the Louisiana statute to other barriers to the
free flow of interstate commerce." The logic of the decision was
therefore inherently self-limiting.
This point was soon made clear in Louisville Railway v.
8 6 Louisville Railway was a dormant commerce
Mississippi.
clause challenge to a Mississippi statute that required carriers to
maintain separate but equal facilities for passengers of different
races. 7 A majority of the Court rejected this challenge,
distinguishing Hall on the ground that the Mississippi courts had
limited the applicability of the statute to intrastate traffic.8 8
Thus, the majority concluded that the limitations imposed on the
states by the commerce clause were not implicated. 9

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 488.
Id. at 489.
Id.
Id. at 489-90 (emphasis added).
Id. at 488-89.
133 U.S. 587 (1890).
Id. at 587-88.
Id. at 589-90.
Id. at 592.
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Dissenting, Harlan took a different view of the statute, arguing
that it applied to all trains operating within the state-even
those engaged in interstate commerce.9 From this perspective,
he saw the case as indistinguishable from Hall, declaring "[ilt is
difficult to understand how a state enactment, requiring the
separation of the white and black races on interstate carriers of
passengers, is a regulation of commerce among the States, while
a similar enactment forbidding such separation is not a
regulation of that character."9 '
Of course, Louisville Railway did not end the controversy over
the constitutionality of state-imposed racial segregation in public
transportation. While rejecting one line of attack, the majority in
that case expressly refused to foreclose other potential
constitutional challenges. The Court noted that because the
action had been initiated by the railroad itself rather than an
individual passenger "there [was] no question of personal insult
or alleged violation of personal rights." 2 Thus, Louisville
Railway left open the possibility that the Mississippi regulation
might be held to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. It was
against this background that Plessy v. Ferguson93 was decided.
III. PLESSY AND BEYOND

In Plessy, the Court considered the constitutionality of a
Louisiana statute that required railroads to maintain separate
but equal accommodations for the "white and colored races" and
to enforce the segregation of the races.94 The statute was
challenged by a man of mixed racial background who was refused
the right to sit in the car reserved for white passengers.95 By a
seven-to-one margin, the Fuller Court upheld the constitutionality of the Louisiana statute.9
Speaking for the majority, Justice Henry B. Brown first
rejected a Thirteenth Amendment challenge to the statute,
declaring that "[a] statute which implies merely a legal
distinction between the white and colored races.., has no

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 592-93 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 594.
Id at 589.
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Id- at 540-41.
Id. at 541-42.
Id. at 551-52.
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tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races, or
reestablish a state of involuntary servitude."9 7 Turning to the
Fourteenth Amendment, Brown began by sketching in general
terms his vision of the reach of the Amendment.
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce
the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in
the nature of things it could not have been intended to
abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as
distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the
two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either."
The key question, of course, was how one was to define the
phrase "equality ...before the law." In part, Brown's treatment
of this issue reflected the evolution of the Republican position on
race during the Reconstruction era. At the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was drafted, many Republicans drew a sharp
distinction between civil rights and political rights, and the
drafters made a conscious decision not to directly protect political
rights." For Brown, by contrast, political equality was an
essential element of equality before the law, and he cited the jury
discrimination struck down in Strauder v. West Virginia as the
classic example of a forbidden racial classification.' 0 Outside
the area of political rights, however, Brown was far more willing
to countenance the use of race in governmental decisionmaking.
He cited a series of state court cases that had upheld school
segregation as paradigms for the view that some racially based
laws did not violate Fourteenth Amendment principles.'0 '
Having established the parameters of his analysis, Brown next
turned to the case law that had dealt specifically with the issue
of segregation by common carriers, concluding that the right of
access to public conveyances did not merit special constitutional
protection." 2 He then applied a rational basis test, noting that
"every exercise of the police power must be reasonable, and
extend only to such laws as are enacted in good faith for the

97. Id. at 543.
98. Id, at 544.
99. See EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 18631869, at 99 (1990).
100. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 545.
101. Id. at 544 (citing Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849), as
the leading case in this line of case law).
102. Id. at 548.
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promotion [of] the public good, and not for the annoyance or
oppression of a particular class."'
Characterizing the
Louisiana statute as an appropriate measure to ensure "good
order" and the comfort of passengers of all races," Brown then
proceeded to the most widely quoted portion of his opinion:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiffs
argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced
separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a
badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of
anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race
chooses to put that construction upon it....

Legislation is

powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish
distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt
to do so can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the
present situation. If the civil and political rights of both races
be equal one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or
politically. If one race be inferior to the other socially, the
Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the
same plane.0 5
Harlan's dissenting opinion, with its ringing endorsement of
the view that "[o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens,"' is normally
juxtaposed with Brown's treatment of the claim that the
Louisiana statute did not imply that blacks were an inferior race.
Unlike Brown, however, Harlan was not addressing the
reasonableness of the statute. Indeed, he explicitly disclaimed the
notion that the classification could be invalidated simply because
the Court found it "unreasonable."0 7
To Harlan, Plessy stood on a somewhat different footing. It
involved the denial of rights that even the majority in the Civil
Rights Cases had suggested that the states were under a
constitutional obligation to protect.' Thus, Harlan's position
was nothing more than a logical extension of his Civil Rights
Cases dissent. His argument for federal power had been premised
on the view that the right to be free from segregation on common

103. Id. at 550.
104. Id.

105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id.
I&
Id

at
at
at
at

551-52.
559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
558-59.
554-57.
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carriers was a fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, and therefore, Congress had authority to directly
secure that right by legislation.0 9 Given that position, he could
hardly countenance a state statute which explicitly violated that
right.
Against this background, it should not be surprising that many
aspects of Harlan's Plessy dissent bear striking similarities to his
Civil Rights Cases dissent. As in the Civil Rights Cases, Harlan
linked the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment to "a common
purpose, namely, to secure 'to a race recently emancipated, a race
that through many generations have been held in slavery, all the
civil rights that the superior race enjoy[s].' ," Once again, his
argument emphasized the fundamental nature of the right at
issue; indeed, his Plessy dissent begins, not with a condemnation
of race discrimination generally, but rather with a renewed
demonstration of the special status of public railways at common
law"'-a demonstration that, later in the opinion, Harlan once
again linked to Blackstone's right of "personal locomotion.""
Moreover, although analogizing the case to Strauder,"' Harlan
was careful to limit his invocations of the principle of colorblindness to situations involving "civil rights," those which he
saw as "common to all citizens,"" concluding that "[t]he
arbitrary separation of citizens, on the basis of race, while they
are on a public highway, is a badge of servitude wholly
inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality before the
law established by the Constitution.""' Thus, by its terms,
Harlan's opinion left open the possibility that he might view
other state-imposed racial classifications as constitutional."'
Harlan's reasoning in Berea College v. Kentucky," 7 his other
major assault on state-imposed segregation, was even more
clearly limited. Berea was an attack on the constitutionality of a
Kentucky statute that prohibited private schools from providing
109. Id. at 557-59.
110. Id. at 555-56 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879)).
111. Id. at 552-57.
112. Id. at 557.
113. Id. at 556-58.
114. Id. at 554.
115. Id. at 562 (emphasis added).
116. OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910, at
362-70 (1993), also emphasizes the importance of the concept of fundamental rights in
Harlan's analysis in Plessy.
117. 211 U.S. 45, 58-70 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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racially integrated education."' The carefully crafted opinion of
the majority upheld the statute as applied to corporations, which
were chartered by the state."' Taking the view that the Court
should answer the more general question of whether the state
could mandate segregation in private schools, 2 ' Harlan
dissented. His primary focus, however, was not on the impact of
the statute on nonwhite students, but rather on the rights of
those who operated private schools."2
The right to impart instruction, harmless in itself or
beneficial to those who receive it, is a substantial right of
property--especially, where the services are rendered for
compensation. But even if such right be not strictly a
property right, it is, beyond question, part of one's liberty as
guaranteed against hostile state action by the Constitution of
the United States.'
Moreover, Harlan explicitly stated that his analysis would be
inapplicable to state-supported educational facilities."
This reservation becomes particularly significant when read
against the background of Harlan's opinion in Cumming v.
Richmond County Board of Election.' In Cumming, a group of
African-American parents launched a Fourteenth Amendment
challenge to the use of their tax dollars to support a high school
for whites when no analogous institution was provided for the
education of African-Americans.'
Speaking for a unanimous
Court, Harlan rejected the African-American parents'
contentions. The specific basis for his ruling was that, even if
there were a Fourteenth Amendment violation in the allocation
of funds, an injunction that undermined the white school was not
an appropriate remedy. 2 ' At the same time, however, the

118. Id. at 46, 59.
119. Id. at 58.

120. Id. at 67.
121. Id. at 67-68.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 69.
124. 175 U.S. 528 (1899). For a detailed discussion and analysis of Cumming, see J.
Morgan Kousser, Separate but not Equal: The Supreme Court's First Decision on
Racial Discrimination in Schools, 46 J.S. HIST. 17 (1980).
125. Cumming, 175 U.S. at 542-44.
126. Id. at 544-45.
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opinion seemed to implicitly approve the concept of segregated
schools 7 and closed with this language:
[W]hile all admit that the benefits and burdens of public
taxation must be shared by citizens without discrimination
against any class on account of their race, the education of
the people in schools maintained by state taxation is a
matter belonging to the respective States, and any
interference on the part of Federal authority with the
management of such schools cannot be justified except in the
case of a clear and unmistakable disregard of rights secured
by the supreme law of the land.'
Even some of Harlan's most ardent admirers see his opinion in
Cumming as rather troubling.' 9 However, taken alone, his
language in the opinion could be viewed as an aberration; after
all, he did not explicitly hold that the maintenance of segregated
schools would be constitutional. Harlan's vote in Pace v.
Alabama,3 ' by contrast, cannot be so easily explained.
Pace was a challenge to the sentencing provisions of an
Alabama statute punishing "adultery [and] fornication." 3 ' If the
parties engaging in the prohibited acts were members of the
same race, the punishment for the first offense was
imprisonment for not more than six months."2 If, however, one
of the parties was white and the other black, the punishment
was imprisonment for between two and seven years. 3 Harlan
concurred silently in Justice Stephen Field's opinion rejecting an
equal protection challenge to the sentencing provisions. Field
reasoned that when either intraracial or interracial acts were
involved, the blacks and whites engaged in the acts were subject
to the same penalties."3 Thus, he concluded, the "discrimination.., made in the punishment prescribed... is directed
against the offence designated and not against the person of any
particular color or race."'35

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 545.
Id.
See BETH, supra note 4, at 235.
106 U.S. 583 (1883).
Id. at 583.
Id. at 584.
Id. at 583-84.
Id. at 585.
Id.
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Harlan's concurrence in Pace belies the notion that he viewed
the Constitution as "color-blind" in any strong sense. Conversely,
it is entirely consistent with the theory that fundamental rights
were at the core of his race discrimination jurisprudence. Neither
adultery nor fornication generally were fundamental rights in
nineteenth century jurisprudence; thus, sorting by race would
only have been unconstitutional if it had resulted in a disparity
in penalties. Since the Alabama statute created no such
disparity, in Harlan's view, the statute was constitutionally
unobjectionable.
Despite Harlan's vote in Pace, if only cases involving free
blacks were considered, he might still be appropriately described
as having been relatively progressive on racial issues. Even given
the limitations of his analysis, he was still more clearly
supportive of free blacks than any other Justice with whom he
served. A more complex picture emerges, however, when one also
considers Harlan's opinions in cases involving other racial
minorities.
IV. HARLAN AND THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS

During Harlan's tenure, the cases dealing with Indian rights
typically revolved around the unique relationship between Indian
tribes and the federal government. The Court had been grappling
with the structure of this relationship since the early nineteenth
century. In 1823, Johnson v. McIntosh36 established the
principle that, in the absence of treaties, the federal government
had the right to dispose of property that had hitherto been
occupied by Indians; 137 however, the problem of defining the
political status of the tribes themselves had created some
difficulty. In Worcester v. Georgia,3 ' Chief Justice John
Marshall seemed to suggest that the Cherokee Indians possessed
a substantial degree of sovereign authority over their lands,
declaring that the agreements between the federal government
and the Indians "manifestly consider the several Indian nations
as distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries,
within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to
all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only

136. 21 U.S. (8Wheat.) 543 (1823).
137. Id. at 603-05.
138. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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acknowledged, but guarantied by the United States."'39 Later,
however, in United States v. Rogers,' Chief Justice Roger
Brooke Taney took a different view, asserting:
The native tribes who were found on this continent at the
time of its discovery have never been acknowledged or
treated as independent nations by the European
governments, nor regarded as the owners of the territories
they respectively occupied. On the contrary, the whole
continent was divided and parcelled out, and granted by the
governments of Europe as if it had been vacant and
unoccupied land, and the Indians continually held to be, and
treated as, subject to their dominion and control.'
Because Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was directed
almost entirely toward the states, it had little impact on the
jurisprudence of Indian rights in the late nineteenth century. Elk
v. Wilkins' is an important exception. Elk arose from the
situation of an Indian who had voluntarily separated himself
from his tribe and then attempted to vote in the State of
Nebraska.' The case turned on the question of whether he
should be considered a citizen of the state under Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment,' which confers that status on "all
persons born... in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof."45 Speaking for the majority, Justice
Horace Gray concluded that Elk was not a citizen and, therefore,
could constitutionally be prevented from voting in state
elections." Gray began with the premise that one could only
become a citizen by virtue of either birth or naturalization.'47
At the time of his birth, Elk was subject to the jurisdiction of an
Indian tribe, which Gray described as "an alien, though
dependent, power"" and could therefore not claim birthright
citizenship in the United States. Since Elk had never been
naturalized, in Gray's view he failed both tests for citizenship-a

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 557.
45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846).
Id. at 572.
112 U.S. 94 (1884).
Id. at 98-99.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 98 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).
Id. at 109.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 102.
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conclusion Gray supported by reference to a variety of historical
evidence which suggested that Indians born subject to tribal
jurisdiction could only obtain citizenship through
naturalization.'
In his dissent, 5 ' Harlan argued that the legislative history of
both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment
itself suggested that Elk should be considered a citizen of the
United States.' He also made a textual argument, noting that
Section 1 by its terms did not require that persons be "born
subject" to the jurisdiction of the United States. 52 By leaving
his tribe, Elk had become "subject to the complete jurisdiction of
the United States" because Indian land should be deemed part of
the United States.'53 These two factors led Harlan to the
conclusion that Elk had satisfied the requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment and should therefore be considered an
American citizen. 54
Harlan also took a different view from the majority in Talton
v. Mayes.'55 Talton was a challenge to a conviction for murder
in a Cherokee tribal court.'5 6 The defendant argued that the
conviction was invalid because he had not been indicted by a
grand jury as required by the Fifth Amendment.'5 7 The Court
rejected this challenge on the ground that the Bill of Rights was
not applicable to proceedings in Cherokee tribunals.'5 8 Speaking
for the majority, Justice Edward White first noted that the
defendant in Talton was charged with a violation of Cherokee
tribal law, rather than a statute of the United States.'5 9 While
reaffirming the plenary power of the federal government over
Cherokee affairs, White also noted that the power of the
Cherokees to govern themselves existed prior to the Constitution
and the establishment of the federal government. 6 ° He
reasoned that, because the authority of the Cherokees was not

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 103-09.
Id. at 110-23 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 112-19.
Id. at 121.
Id. at 121-22.
Id. at 122-23.
163 U.S. 376 (1896).
Id. at 379.
Id.
Id. at 384.
Id. at 381.
Id. at 384.
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derived from the federal government, the Fifth Amendment,
which bound only the federal government, did not constrain the
actions of tribal courts.16 '
Harlan dissented without opinion. 161 In the abstract, this vote
might be characterized in a variety of different ways. For
example, it might be viewed as reflecting a solicitude for Indian
rights. Alternatively, it might be seen as a manifestation of
Harlan's fierce devotion to the Bill of Rights-a devotion most
clearly evidenced by his well-known dissent in Hurtado v.
California."
Both Elk and Talton might also be viewed in a less flattering
light, however. Both votes can be seen as premised on the theory
that the tribes and tribal governments should be seen as little
more than subdivisions of the government of the United States.
This view in turn is antithetical to the notion that the tribes
should be accorded sovereign or quasi-sovereign status. On
occasion, as in Elk and Talton, this theory might redound to the
benefit of individual Indians. At the same time, however, it could
hardly be viewed as favorable to the long-term interests of
Indians as a group. This point emerged clearly in the most
significant late nineteenth century constitutional decisions
dealing with the rights of Indian tribes: United States 16v.5
Kagama," Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway,
and Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.6 '
Kagama was a challenge to the constitutionality of the Major
Crimes Act of 1885, which provided that a number of crimes
committed by one Indian against another within the geographical
limits of Indian reservations could be tried in the federal courts
under the laws of the United States.

6'

Harlan joined in a

unanimous opinion that held the Major Crimes Act constitutional.' Speaking for the Court, Justice Samuel Miller clearly
embraced the Rogers analysis, rejecting any implications of

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id at 384-85.
Id. at 385.
110 U.S. 516, 538-58 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
118 U.S. 375 (1886).
135 U.S. 641 (1890).
187 U.S. 553 (1903).
See generally SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG'S CASE: AMERICAN

INDIAN

SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

(1994) (describing in detail events that ultimately led to Kagama decision).
168. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384-85.
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residual Indian sovereignty that might have been inherent in
Worcester.'69 Miller dismissed the Indian Commerce Clause as a
source for congressional authority, and conceded that no specific
constitutional provision provided Congress with authority to pass
the Major Crimes Act. 7 ' Instead, he found authority for the
statute in the basic principle that Congress had sovereign
authority over all persons and property within the territorial
boundaries of the United States.' 7 '
[T]hese Indians are within the geographical limits of the
United States. The soil and the people within these limits are
under the political control of the Government of the United
States, or of the States of the Union. There exists within the
broad domain of sovereignty but these two.
...

These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They

are communities dependent on the United States.... From
their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the
course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and
the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the
duty of protection, and with it the power.
The power of the General Government over these
remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished
in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the
safety of those among whom they dwell. It must exist in that
government, because it never has existed anywhere else,
because the theatre of its exercise is within the geographical
limits of the United States, because it has never been denied,
172
and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.
While Harlan did not write separately in Kagama, he gave no
indication that he disagreed with any aspect of Miller's approach.
Moreover, four years later, he explicitly adopted the Kagama
analysis in Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railway.17 1 In
that case, a federal statute granted the railroad a right of way
through the Cherokee reservation, and also provided a
mechanism for determining the compensation due the Cherokees

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 380-84.
Id. at 378-79.
Id. at 379.
Id. at 379, 383-85.
135 U.S. 641 (1890).
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for the use of their land. 74 Dissatisfied with the compensation,
the Cherokees filed a lawsuit in which they alleged that they had
sovereign authority over reservation land and thus could prevent
the railroad from using that land without their consent.'75
Speaking for a unanimous Court, Harlan rejected this contention,
concluding:
The proposition that the Cherokee Nation is sovereign in the
sense that the United States is sovereign, or in the sense that
the several States are sovereign, and that that nation alone
can exercise the power of eminent domain within its limits,
finds no [legal] support .... From the beginning of the
government to the present time, they have been treated as
"wards of the nation," "in a state of pupilage," "dependent
political communities"

. . .

. [No]

treaties

evinced

any

intention, upon the part of the government, to discharge
them from their condition of pupilage or dependency, and
constitute them a separate, independent, sovereign people,
with no superior within its limits. 76
This analysis was reinforced and extended in Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock.'" The complex fact situation of Lone Wolf' 78
revolved around the Medicine Lodge Treaty of 1867, which
provided that the heads of families of the Kiowa and Comanche
tribes could claim 320 acres from the common land of the
reservation as separate property, and provided further that
reservation land could not be ceded without the consent of threefourths of the male adult Indians occupying the land. 79 Later,
the Apache tribe was brought under the same regime. 8 ° In
1892, 456 adult males signed a treaty ceding over two million
acres of reservation land in exchange for a payment of two
million dollars to be held in trust; the Indian agent certified that
at the time, the three tribes contained 562 male adults.' 8 ' After

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at 642-46.
Id. at 646-50.
Id. at 653-54.
187 U.S. 553 (1903).
See Ann Laquer Estin, Long Wolf v. Hitchock: The Long Shawdow, in THE

AGGRESSIONS

OF CIVILIZATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY SINCE THE 1880S,

at 215-45

(Sandra L. Cadwalader & Vine Deloria, Jr. eds., 1984) (discussing Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock in detail).
179. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 554, 563-64.
180. Id. at 554.
181. Id. at 554-55.
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Congress adopted implementing legislation, members of the
relevant tribe sought to void the agreement.'82 They alleged
that the count of eligible adult males was wrong, and that less
than three-quarters had in fact signed the agreement.'8 3
Moreover, they contended that the signatures had been
fraudulently obtained because the translator had misled them
regarding the amount that they would receive." Finally, they
asserted that the implementing legislation unlawfully changed
the agreement that was signed. Under these circumstances, the
Indians argued that implementation of the agreement would
violate the Fifth Amendment by depriving them of a property
interest that was established by treaty."5
Once again, the Court unanimously rejected the Indians'
argument. Speaking for the majority, Justice Edward White
quoted at length from Kagama and reemphasized the plenary
authority of Congress over Indian affairs-even in the face of
contrary treaty language:
When... treaties were entered into between the United
States and a tribe of Indians it was never doubted that the
power to abrogate existed in Congress, and that in a
contingency such power might be availed of from
considerations of governmental policy, particularly if
consistent with perfect good faith towards the Indians.
... Congress [has full administrative power] over Indian
tribal property. In effect, the action of Congress now
complained of was but an exercise of such power, a mere
change in the form of investment of Indian tribal property,
the property of those who.., were in substantial effect the
wards of the government. We must presume that Congress
acted in perfect good faith in the dealings with the Indians of
which complaint is made, and that the legislative branch of
the government exercised its best judgment in the premises.
In any event, as Congress possessed full power in the matter,
the judiciary cannot question or inquire into the motives
which prompted the enactment of this legislation.18

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id at
Id.
Id. at
Id at
Id. at

556, 561.
556.
564.
566, 568.
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While not issuing an opinion in Lone Wolf, Harlan noted that
he concurred only in the result.'87 Thus, his views of the
appropriate analysis may have differed substantially from those
expressed by the majority. Nonetheless, the fact that he, like the
majority, apparently did not even consider the Lone Wolf
allegations as raising issues of constitutional dimensions can only
be interpreted as reflecting a lack of sympathy for Indian rights
generally-particularly when considered in light of his
concurrence in Kagama and opinion in South Kansas Railway.
Against this background, Harlan's dissents in Talton and Elk
should not be seen as the embodiment of a particularly powerful
concern for Indian rights. Instead, they are best understood as
the expressions of marginal differences between Harlan and a
majority who shared the same basic understanding of the place of
Indians and Indian tribes in late nineteenth century American
society. Given the Court's treatment of Indian claims during this
era, this is hardly the mark of a man committed to racial justice
generally.
V.

HARLAN AND THE RIGHTS OF THE CHINESE

Harlan's treatment of cases involving the constitutional rights
of the Chinese in America is, if anything, even more damning
than his approach to Indian rights. In the Indian rights cases, he
was, at least, no less sympathetic than other Justices to the
claims of the relevant racial minority. In the Chinese-related
cases, by contrast, Harlan proved even more reactionary than
most of his contemporaries.
As in the Indian cases, the constitutional jurisprudence of
Chinese rights was shaped in large measure by the special
political status of the Chinese in late nineteenth and early
twentieth century America.18 Under the ideology embodied in
the Reconstruction Amendments, native-born Americans were
automatically entitled to the status of citizenship and the full
rights appurtenant to that status.'89 However, virtually all the
Chinese in America during Harlan's era were immigrants, and
the only conceivable route to citizenship for immigrants was
187. Id. at 568.
188. This discussion is taken from Earl M. Maltz, The Federal Government and the
Problem of Chinese Rights in the Era of the Fourteenth Amendment, 17 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 223 (1994).
189. Id. at 227.
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through the process of naturalization. This mechanism in turn
was barred to the Chinese by the existing naturalization statute,
which limited access to naturalization to "free white
persons"' 9 0 -a limitation that had been inserted in the first
naturalization act passed by Congress. 9 '
Early in the Reconstruction era, Congress took a number of
actions that reinforced this distinction and emphasized its
significance. First, while the Burlingame Treaty of 1868 provided
that "Chinese subjects visiting or residing in the United States,
shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities, and exemptions in
respect to travel or residence, as may be enjoyed by the citizens
or subjects of the most favored nation,"'92 the Senate added a
provision-apparently unique-which provided that none of the
provisions of the treaty required the United States to extend
naturalized citizenship to Chinese immigrants. 9 ' Second, while
the Civil Rights Act of 1870 specifically protected aliens from
racial discrimination in many of the same rights guaranteed to
black citizens by the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the 1870 Act did
not make any reference to property rights.'94 This difference
was not accidental; the right to obtain and hold real estate was
associated with citizenship in nineteenth century legal thought,
and the decision to omit it from the Act was a conscious one.19s
Finally, in the comprehensive Naturalization Reform Act of
1870,16 Congress rejected proposals that would have eliminated
all racial barriers to naturalization, but lifted the bar on "aliens
of African nativity and ...

persons of African descent."197

Beginning in the 1870s, the political situation of the Chinese
in America deteriorated rapidly. In 1876 the platforms of both
major political parties contained anti-Chinese planks; 98 in the

190. Uniform Rule of Naturalization Act, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed
1795).
191. Id.
192. Maltz, supra note 188, at 229 (quoting Burlingame Treaty).
193. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 4275-76 (1870) (remarks of Rep. Sargent).
Sargent's account was not questioned, and is largely corroborated by CONG. GLOBE,
40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1011 (1869) (remarks of Sen. Doolittle) and CONG. GLOBE, 42d

Cong., 2d Sess. 910 (1872) (remarks of Sen. Nye).
194. Civil Rights Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140.
195. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1536 (1870).
196. Naturalization Reform Act of 1870, ch. 254, 16 Stat. 254.
197. Id. § 7, 16 Stat. at 256.
198. Republican Platform of 1876, reprinted in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 1840-

1972, at 54 (Donald B. Johnson & Kirk H. Porter, comp., 5th ed. 1973) (calling for
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same year, a congressional committee was established to
investigate the Chinese problem. While a minority of the
committee members defended the Chinese and favored continued
unfettered immigration,'9 9 the majority report advocated the
renegotiation of the Burlingame Treaty to permit the restriction
of Chinese entry."0 A bill limiting the number of Chinese who
could be carried by a single vessel to the United States passed
both houses of Congress in 1878,0 only to be vetoed by
President Rutherford B. Hayes on the ground that the limitation
was inconsistent with existing treaty obligations." 2 However, in
1882 a ten-year moratorium on the entrance of Chinese into the
United States was passed by Congress and signed into law by
President Chester A. Arthur.0 3 Subsequently, in 1888 the ban
was extended to include Chinese who had come to the United
States, departed, and later attempted to return.2 Finally, in
1892 the Geary Act both extended the moratorium and imposed
stringent requirements on Chinese who had entered the country
prior to the 1882 moratorium.2 5
Harlan rather plainly shared the widespread prejudice against
the Chinese that led to the passage of the Exclusion Acts and the
Geary Act. This attitude was clearly reflected in Plessy, where he
disparaged the Chinese in remarks whose tenor was strikingly
different than his pronouncements regarding free blacks. On one
hand, he declared:
Sixty millions of whites are in no danger from the presence
here of eight millions of blacks. The destinies of the two
races, in this country, are indissolubly linked together, and
the interests of both require that the common government of
investigation of problems created by Chinese immigration); Democratic Platform of
1876, reprinted in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 1840-1972, at 50 (Donald B. Johnson
& Kirk H. Porter, comp., 5th ed. 1973) (calling for end to Chinese immigration).
199. Views of the Late Oliver P. Morton on the Character, Extent, and Effect of
Chinese Immigration to the United States, S. MISc. Doc. No. 20, 45th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1878).
200. S. REP. No. 689, 44th Cong., 2d Sess. (1877).
201. 8 CONG. REc. 1400, 1796 (1878).
202. 7 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT 514-20 (James D. Richardson ed.,

1899).
203. See An Act to Execute Certain Treaty Stipulations Relating to Chinese, ch. 126,
22 Stat. 58-61 (1882).
204. See An Act in Supplement to an Act Titled, "An Act to Execute Certain Treaty
Stipulations Relating to Chinese," ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504 (1888).
205. See An Act to Prohibit the Coming of Chinese Persons into the United States,
ch. 60, 26 Stat. 25-26 (1892).
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all shall not permit the 206
seeds of race hate to be planted
under the sanction of law.
By contrast, he used the fact that the Louisiana statute did not
bar Chinese from sitting in "white" cars to buttress his attack on
the statute:
There is a race so different from our own that we do not
permit those belonging to it to become citizens of the United
States. Persons belonging to it are, with few exceptions,
absolutely excluded from our country. I allude to the Chinese
race. But by the statute in question, a Chinaman can ride in
the same passenger coach with white citizens of the United
States, while citizens of the black race in Louisiana, many of
whom, perhaps, risked their lives for the preservation of the
Union [are required to sit in segregated cars].0 7
Obviously, this attitude did not predispose Harlan to support
Chinese claims of constitutional rights. At the same time,
however, Harlan remained committed to the concept that the
Constitution protected natural rights, and to a broad conception
of federal power to enforce those rights. Given these sometimes
conflicting factors, it is not surprising that Harlan's voting record
on cases involving the rights of the Chinese was somewhat
mixed. On one hand, he showed a relatively strong commitment
to the protection of lawfiully present Chinese from oppression by
state governments and private individuals. On the other hand,
however, he was an even stronger supporter of the power of
Congress to determine the conditions under which the Chinese
could be admitted to and remain in the United States.
A.

State and Private Oppression of Legally Present Chinese

In some respects, the legal issues that arose from the plight of
the Chinese paralleled those raised by the mistreatment of free
blacks. One set of issues involved the impact of the Fourteenth
Amendment on the power of states to discriminate on the basis of
race. Other cases raised the question of federal power to prevent
and punish private discrimination.0 8

206. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 561.
208. The relevant case law is described in detail in FISS, supra note 116, and
CHARLES J.

MCCLAIN, IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY: THE CHINESE STRUGGLE AGAINST

DISCRIMINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1994).
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The Fourteenth Amendment and State Power-Yick Wo
v. Hopkins. 9

Economic discrimination was one of the most important
obstacles faced by the Chinese in America. Prejudice against
them sharply limited their employment opportunities.21 In a
few less desirable industries, however, they came to dominate the
market.211 The commercial laundry industry was one such area
of Chinese dominance.2' For example, in 1880 it was estimated
that of 320 laundries in San Francisco approximately 240 were
owned by Chinese,2 13 and in 1882 one anti-Chinese group of
trade unionists estimated that commercial laundries in San
Francisco employed 5,107 Chinese and only 615 whites.214 This
industry thus presented a tempting target for the anti-Chinese
political movement. Against this background, in 1880 the City of
San Francisco adopted an ordinance that required the approval of
the city board of supervisors in order to operate a laundry in a
building not constructed of brick or stone.215 Harlan joined the
Court that struck down this ordinance in Yick Wo v.
unanimous
216
Hopkins.

Under the Court's view of the ordinance, the supervisors had
unfettered discretion to grant or deny applications.217 Moreover,
the supervisors had denied consent to each of the two hundred
Chinese who had applied for permission to operate laundries in
wooden buildings; conversely, eighty non-Chinese had been
granted such permission, while only one white had been denied
approval.218
209. 118 U.S. 365 (1886). The discussion of Yick Wo and the Chinese Exclusion Case
is taken from Maltz, supra note 188.
210. See generally PING CHIU, CHINESE LABOR IN CALIFORNIA, 1850-1880 (1963)
(discussing in detail economic problems and opportunities of the Chinese community).
211. ALEXANDER P. SAX'TON, THE INDISPENSABLE ENEMY: LABOR AND THE ANTICHINESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA 168 (1971).
212. Paul Ong, The Chinese and the Laundry Laws, The Use and Control of Urban
Space 32-65 (1977) (unpublished M. thesis, University of Washington) (describing the
development of Chinese involvement in the laundry industry).
213. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 358-59.
214. SAXTON, supra note 211, at 170; see also JACK CHEN, THE CHINESE OF AMERICA
58 (1980) (stating Chinese dominated commercial laundry industry in San Francisco
by 1870).
215. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 357-58.
216. Id. at 374.
217. Id. at 366-67.
218. Id. at 359; TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1483 n.3 (noting that facts of Yiko Wo may
not in fact have so clearly reflected discrimination against the Chinese).
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Race played little direct role in most of Justice Stanley
Matthew's opinion. Instead, the opinion focused primarily on the
arbitrary nature of the decisionmaking process. Justice Matthews
began by noting that, while not citizens, Chinese immigrants
could claim the benefit of both the Burlingame Treaty and the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and that the Civil Rights Act of 1870 had
reaffirmed this protection.219 Matthews then emphasized that
an aspect of "the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness,""' was at stake, declaring:
[T]he very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his
life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to
the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be
intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being
the essence of slavery itself."
In characterizing the Yick Wo ordinance as imposing just such a
requirement, the Court analogized the situation to cases
involving the arbitrary fixing of utility rates. 2 and the forced
removal of a steam engine from a box-maker's shop.223 Thus,
the Court suggested that the ordinance was unconstitutional on
its face.2"
It was only at this point that race entered directly into the
Court's argument. Justice Matthews noted that, because the
record reflected the actual operation of the challenged
ordinances, "we are not obliged to reason from the probable to
the actual, and pass upon the validity of the ordinances
complained of, as tried merely by the opportunities which their
terms afford, of unequal and unjust discrimination in their
administration."2" He concluded:
[W]hatever may have been the intent of the ordinances as
adopted, they are applied by the public authorities charged
with their administration.., with a mind so unequal and
oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the State of
that equal protection of the laws ....Though the law itself

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 368-69.
Id. at 370.
Id.
Id at 371.
Id. at 372.
Id. at 373.
Id.
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be fair on its face and impartial in its appearance, yet, if it is
applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye
and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and
illegal discriminations between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal
justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.
... No reason whatever, except the will of the supervisors,
is assigned why [the Chinese] should not be permitted to
carry on, in the accustomed manner, their harmless and
useful occupation, on which they depend for a livelihood....
No reason for [the discriminatory pattern] is shown, and the
conclusion cannot be resisted, that no reason for it exists
except hostility to the race and nationality to which the
petitioners belong, and which in the eye of the law is not
justified. The discrimination is, therefore, illegal .... "'
Despite this language, the structure of the opinion limits its
usefulness as a measure of sympathy for the plight of the
Chinese generally. First, Matthews's argument was not directed
solely at racial discrimination. Instead, the use of the ordinance
to discriminate against the Chinese was seen as a specific
example of a more general problem-the likelihood that officials
with unfettered discretion would use that discretion to create the
functional equivalent of the "class legislation" condemned in Soon
Hing v. Crowley.2 27 The same reasoning would apply to the use
of official discretion to place any small, identifiable group at a
disadvantage.
Further, the Yick Wo opinion was explicitly limited to
deprivations of rights that the Court deemed "fundamental," the
rights to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"--terms
which, in the late nineteenth century, were limited to natural or
vested rights.2" The opinion explicitly recognized that "in many
cases ... the responsibility [for final decisionmaking] is purely
political, [with] no appeal lying except to the ultimate tribunal of
the public judgment."2 29 Thus, Harlan's concurrence in the
decision cannot be viewed as presaging a generalized rejection of
governmentally imposed discrimination against the Chinese.

226. Id. at 373-74.
227. 113 U.S. 703, 711 (1885).
228. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370. For a fuller discussion of the nineteenth century
theory of fundamental rights, see MALTZ, supra note 99, at 99.
229. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370.
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2. Federal Power to Protect the Chinese from Private
Discrimination-Baldwinv. Franks23 °
Like free blacks, the Chinese were subject to private as well as
state-imposed discrimination. A number of federal statutes
arguably reached such private actions. The applicability and
constitutionality of these statutes was at issue in Baldwin v.
Franks.231

Baldwin began as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.232
The petition was filed by a man arrested on allegations that he
had participated in a conspiracy that resulted in the forcible
removal of a number of lawfully resident Chinese from their
homes and had forced them to leave the county in which they
resided, thus depriving the Chinese of "the privilege of
conducting their legitimate business and of the privilege of
laboring to earn a living."233 Three sections of the Revised
Statutes of 1874 were potentially relevant. Section 5519, derived
from the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, provided for the punishment
of those who "in any state or territory conspire.., for the
purpose of depriving... any person or class of persons of the
equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws.... 2 Section 5508, derived from
the Enforcement Act of 1870, provided for the punishment of
those who "conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate
any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or
privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the
United States" or to "go in disguise on the highway, or on the
premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free
exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured." 3 '
Finally, section 5336, once again derived from the Ku Klux Klan
Act, provided for the punishment of those who conspire "by force
to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the
United States." 3 '

230. 120 U.S. 678 (1887).
231. Id. at 680-81. Charles J. McClain, Jr., The Chinese Struggle for Civil Rights in
Nineteenth Century America: The Unusual Case of Baldwin v. Franks, 3 LAW & HIST.
REV. 349 (1985), provides a detailed discussion and analysis of Baldwin.
232. Baldwin, 120 U.S. at 680.
233. Id. at 681 (quoting the warrant issued by a commissioner of the circuit court).
234. Id. at 683-84 (quoting Revised Statutes of 1874, ch. 7, § 5519, 18 Stat. 1070).
235. Id. at 684 (quoting Revised Statutes of 1874, ch. 7, § 5508, 18 Stat. 1067).
236. Id. (quoting Revised Statutes of 1874, ch. 2, § 5536, at 1037).
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Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite
held that none of these provisions provided sufficient basis for
holding the petitioner in custody.23 7 He first noted that in
2 3 the Court had held that section 5519
United States v. Harris,
could not constitutionally be applied to private conspiracies
against citizens, and that the statute itself made no distinction
between offenses against citizens and aliens, respectively.2 9
Thus, he concluded that Harris governed this portion of Baldwin
as well.' By contrast, Waite conceded that section 5508 could
constitutionally be applied to protect aliens; however, he argued
that the reference to "citizens" in the first clause of section 5508
indicated that the entire provision was limited to invasions of the
rights of citizens, and that the section therefore did not provide
protection for the Chinese.24 1 Finally, Waite concluded that
section 5336 applied only to interference with the government or
its officials, rather than violence against private individuals.2 42
Thus, the majority found that the petitioners had not been
charged with the violation of any enforceable federal statute.
Harlan disagreed with Waite's analyses of both sections 5519
2 ' and
and 5508.' He had not reached the merits in Harris,
took Baldwin as an occasion to argue that the Court had unduly
limited the scope of federal power in that case.245 Harlan also
contended that, in holding that section 5508 did not apply to
wrongs done to aliens, the Court had improperly disregarded the
plain language of the statute.24 Under this view, the
application for the writ of habeas corpus would have been
denied.24 7
In part, Harlan's opinion in Baldwin no doubt reflected
considerations that were independent of the issue of Chinese
rights. Because of his position in Harris, Harlan was provided

237. Id. at 694.
238. 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
239. Baldwin, 120 U.S. at 685-86.
240. Id. at 685-90.
241. Id. at 690-92.
242. Id. at 692-94.
243. Id. at 694-701 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
244. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 644 (1883).
245. Baldwin, 120 U.S. at 698-701.
246. Id. at 694-98.
247. Id. at 701-07. Justice Stephen Field also dissented. While suggesting that he
shared Harlan's view of section 5508, Field primarily relied on the view that section
5336 criminalized the conduct of the petitioners. Id. at 706-07.
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with his first opportunity to defend the constitutionality of the
Ku Klux Klan Act in Baldwin. While in Baldwin itself the Act
was invoked to protect the Chinese, it was aimed primarily at
violence against blacks in the ex-Confederate states. Thus, this
portion of Harlan's opinion embodied his solicitude for federal
power to protect free blacks more than his attitude toward the
rights of the Chinese.
By contrast, Harlan's treatment of the Enforcement Act of
1870 cannot be understood in these terms. Interpreting the
Enforcement Act to protect aliens was of no particular benefit to
the freed slaves; with the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, they had become citizens of the United States. The
Chinese were therefore the primary beneficiaries of Harlan's
construction of the Act. In short, if only Yick Wo and Baldwin
were considered, Harlan could well be characterized as a
champion of the Chinese as well as free blacks.
However, this characterization would be misleading. While
state and private discrimination created major problems for the
Chinese in the late nineteenth century, the restrictions imposed
by federal legislation posed an even more important threat. The
Court was often called upon to evaluate constitutional challenges
to these statutes. Harlan's record in these cases can hardly be
characterized as reflecting either sympathy for the Chinese or
distaste for discrimination against them.
B. The Immigration and NaturalizationCases
In the late nineteenth century, all of the Justices on the Court
agreed that certain basic principles governed the constitutional
power of Congress to deal with the Chinese. On one hand,
Congress had virtually unfettered authority to prevent Chinese
nationals from entering the United States. On the other hand,
Chinese people who were already present in this country were
protected by the provisions of the Bill of Rights.
The first principle was established by the famous (or infamous)
Chinese Exclusion Case.' There a Chinese laborer petitioned
for a writ of habeas corpus that would have allowed him to enter
the United States. The laborer had previously been a resident of
this country, but had returned temporarily to China after
receiving an official certificate that purported to allow him re-

248. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
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entry to the United States.249 Nonetheless, he was denied reentry pursuant to the 1888 statute that forbade Chinese laborers
to enter the country under these circumstances. He argued that
the denial violated both the treaty obligations of the United
States and the federal Constitution." ° The Court unanimously
rejected both of these arguments.2 '
The Court conceded that the denial was inconsistent with the
provisions of existing treaties between the United States and
China. 2 However, citing the established principle that "'so far
as a treaty made by the United States with any foreign nation
can become the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this
country, it is subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its
the Court held that
enforcement, modification, or repeal,' ,
treaty." Thus, the
the
overrode
effectively
the 1888 statute
controlling question in the case was whether the statute itself
was consistent with the Constitution. 5 Here, the Court based
its decision on a sweeping conception of congressional power over
immigration, declaring that "[i]f... the government of the
United States, through its legislative department, considers the
presence of foreigners of a different race ... to be dangerous to
its peace and security ... [the decision to exclude them] is
conclusive upon the judiciary." 6 In short, the Chinese
Exclusion Court held that the Constitution imposed no
constraints on congressional power to prevent noncitizens from
entering the United States.
Wong Wing v. United States,' by contrast, established the
outer limits of congressional authority to deal with persons
illegally present in the United States. Under the Geary Act, an
immigration officer's determination that a Chinese person was
unlawfully present in the country not only led to that person's
deportation, but also condemned him to up to a year's
imprisonment."8 In Wong Wing, the Court unanimously held

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id. at 582.
Id. at 584-89.
Id at 604-11.
Id. at 600.
Id. (quoting The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884)).
Id. at 600-03.
Id. at 603.
Id. at 606.
163 U.S. 228 (1896).
Id. at 230-31 (citing Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, § 6, 27 Stat. 25).
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the latter provision inconsistent with the Bill of Rights.2 59
Speaking for the Court, Justice George Shiras reaffirmed plenary
congressional authority over immigration26 and conceded that
Congress could make the continued presence of Chinese people a
crime, and could also provide for their temporary detention as an
adjunct to deportation. 2 1 However, analogizing the case to Yick
Wo, 26 2 he noted that illegal aliens were nonetheless persons

within the purview of the Bill of Rights 263 and declared that
"when

Congress

sees

fit

to ... promote

[its]

policy

by

subjecting... aliens to infamous punishment at hard labor, or by
confiscating their property, we think such legislation, to be valid,
must provide for a judicial trial to establish the guilt of the
accused."2u
Although all the members of the Fuller Court agreed on the
basic principles established by the Chinese Exclusion Cases and
Wong Wing, they remained deeply divided on other important
issues relating to the rights of the Chinese. The divisions on the
Court emerged clearly in Fong Yue Ting v. United States265 and
United States v. Wong Kim Ark.266
Fong Yue Ting was a constitutional challenge to the stringent
requirements that the Geary Act had imposed on those Chinese
who had entered the country prior to the passage of the Chinese
Exclusion Acts. 27 Arguing that aliens who had been lawfully
admitted to the United States had a protectable liberty interest
in not being deported, the dissenting opinions of Chief Justice
Melville Fuller 2' and Justices Stephen Field2 9 and David
Brewer27° sharply denounced the provisions of the Geary Act.
Declaring that "[a]liens from countries at peace with us,
domiciled within our country by its consent, are entitled to all
the guaranties for the protection of their persons and property

259. Id. at 237.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 235.
262. I am indebted to my colleague Linda Bosniak for calling my attention to the
relationship between Wong Wing and Yick Wo.
263. Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 238.
264. Id. at 237.
265. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
266. 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
267. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 702-04.
268. Id. at 761-63 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
269. Id at 744-61 (Field, J., dissenting).
270. Id at 732-44 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
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which are secured to native-born citizens,"27' Field launched a
strong attack on both the substance and procedure of the Act.
Noting that "deportation is... imposed for neglect to obtain a
certificate of residence,"272 he declared that:
The punishment is beyond all reason in its severity. It is
out of all proportion to the alleged offence. It is cruel and
unusual. As to its cruelty, nothing can exceed a forcible
deportation from a country of one's residence, and the
breaking up of all the relations of friendship, family, and
business there contracted. The laborer may be seized at a
distance from his home, his family and his business, and
taken before the judge for his condemnation, without
permission to visit his home, see his family, or complete any
unfinished business. 3
Asserting that, in his view, "[eivery step in the procedure...
tramples upon some constitutional right,"274 Field also focused
on the requirement that a white witness provide the necessary
exculpatory evidence, noting that "the government undertakes to
exact of the party arrested the testimony of a witness of a
particular color, though conclusive and incontestible testimony
from others may be adduced."27 This emphasis is particularly
striking coming from one of the two dissenters in Ex Parte
277 in which the
Virginia276 and Strauder v. West Virginia,
held unconstitutional the exclusion of blacks from
Court had
8
27

juries.

The issue of race discrimination was emphasized even more
strongly in Justice Brewer's dissenting opinion. Noting that "[t]he
expulsion of a race may be within the inherent powers of a
despotism," 27 9 he argued that, in the United States, "among the

powers reserved to the people and not delegated to the
government is that of determining whether whole classes in our
midst shall, for no crime but that of their race and birthplace, be

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Id. at 754 (Field, J., dissenting).
Id. at 758.
Id. at 759.
Id. at 760.
Id. at 759.
100 U.S. 339, 349-370 (1879) (Field, J., dissenting).
100 U.S. 303, 312 (Field, J., dissenting).
Id. at 346-49.
Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 737 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
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driven from our territory."" ° He later observed "[ilt is true this
statute is directed only against the... Chinese; but if the power
exists, who shall say it will not be exercised to-morrow against
other classes and other people?"28 '
All these arguments left the majority of the Justices (including
Harlan) unmoved. Speaking for the Court, Justice Horace Gray
analogized the right to expel aliens to the right to exclude aliens,
and held the Geary Act a valid exercise of the plenary federal
power over immigration.282 Yick Wo was distinguished on the
ground that it involved state authority over lawfully resident
aliens, rather than congressional power over their continued
residence."
By concurring silently with the majority in Fong Yue Ting,
Harlan implicitly rejected the dissenters' condemnation of the
racial classification in the Geary Act. Moreover, only two years
later, Harlan spoke for a divided Court in Lem Moon Sing v.
United States, 2 4 which emphatically reaffirmed support for
Gray's analysis."

Thus, he firmly aligned himself with the

most anti-Chinese forces on the Court and in the political
process.
Harlan showed no greater sympathy for Chinese rights in
United States v. Wong Kim Ark.286 Wong Kim Ark was a man
27
who had been born in the United States to Chinese parents.
After visiting China, he was denied the right to re-enter the
United States under the terms of the Exclusion Act." He
argued that the terms of the Act did not apply to him because,
having been
born in the United States, he was a citizen of this
28 9
country.

In purely doctrinal terms, Wong Kim Ark turned on the proper
interpretation of the language of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which provides that "[a]ll persons born.., in the
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Id. at 738.
Id. at 743.
Id. at 724, 732.
Id- at 725.
158 U.S. 538 (1895).
Id. at 544-47.
169 U.S. 649 (1898); see Charles J. McClain, Tortuous Path, Elusive Goal: The

Asian Quest for American Citizenship, 2 ASIAN L.J. 33 (1995) (describing in detail the
background of Wong Kim Ark).

287. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 652.
288. Id. at 653.
289. Id.
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United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens
of the United States."29 Wong Kim Ark contended that this
language embodied the common-law principle that birth within
the territorial boundaries of a nation conferred citizenship in that
nation.29 ' He argued simply that as a person born in the United
States, he was entitled to citizenship under the plain language of
the Fourteenth Amendment.2 This interpretation also draws
support from the legislative history of this provision of Section 1;
opponents of the amendment attacked the citizenship language
precisely because it would confer citizenship on persons such as
Wong Kim Ark,293 and at
least one prominent Republican
294
senator conceded the point.

The counterargument focused on the requirement that persons
born in the United States must also be "subject to the jurisdiction
thereof." Relying on the Roman principle that a child's citizenship
followed that of its parents, this argument rested on the
contention that a child of Chinese parents born in the United
States should be viewed as subject to the jurisdiction of the
Chinese government, rather than that of the United States. Dicta
in the Slaughterhouse Cases seemed to support this view.295
Of course, in the context of Wong Kim Ark, this argument had
a clear racial subtext. The point emerged clearly in an amicus
brief opposing Wong Kim Ark's claim:
For the most persuasive reasons we have refused
citizenship to Chinese subjects; and yet, as to their offspring,
who are just as obnoxious, and to whom the same reasons for
exclusion apply with equal force, we are told that we must
accept them as fellow-citizens, and that, too, because of the
mere accident of birth. There certainly should be some honor
and dignity in American citizenship that would be sacred
from the foul and corrupting taint of a debasing alienage.296

290. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).
291. Id. at 653.
292. Id. at 692-94.
293. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2939 (remarks of Sen. Hendricks); id. at
2890 (remarks of Sen. Cowan).
294. Id. at 2891 (remarks of Sen. Conness).
295. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72-81 (1872).
296. McClain, supra note 286, at 40-41 (quoting from Brief on Behalf of the
Appellant at 34, United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (No. 904)).
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It was against this background that a divided Court held that
Wong Kim Ark was in fact a citizen of the United States.297
Once more speaking for the majority, Justice Horace Gray
essayed a detailed review of the common-law precedents dealing
with the issue of birthright citizenship.298 After noting that the
relevant language from the Slaughterhouse Cases was dictum,
Gray then observed that a contrary decision would threaten the
claims of not only the descendants of the Chinese, but also the
citizenship of descendants of immigrants from many other
countries. 2 ' Gray also made a pointed reference to the
impropriety of distorting legal principles in order to accommodate
race-based legislation.
Whatever considerations, in the absence of a controlling
provision of the Constitution, might influence the legislative
or the executive branch of the Government to decline to
admit persons of the Chinese race to the status of citizens of
the United States, there are none that can constrain or
permit the judiciary to refuse to give full effect to the
peremptory and explicit language of the Fourteenth
Amendment... .30
In contrast to Fong Yue Ting, Harlan did not join Gray's
majority opinion in Wong Kim Ark; instead, he concurred in Chief
Justice Fuller's dissent. °1 Fuller spent most of his dissent
canvassing the legal precedents on citizenship, ultimately

concluding that they did not support Gray's position. However,
Fuller ended his dissent by noting that what was at stake in
Wong Kim Ark was congressional authority to make color-based
distinction in citizenship determinations." 2 Thus, once again,
the influence of the race issue on legal analysis was only thinly
disguised.

Taken together, Harlan's positions in Fong Yue Ting and Wong
Kim Ark create a dramatic counterpoint to his famous dissents in

Plessy and the Civil Rights Cases. In the latter cases, he stood
297. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 647, 704-05 (1897).

298. Id. at 692-703.
299. Id. at 694.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 705-32 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting). Harlan's position in Wong Kim Ark is
particularly striking because he was one of only two justices to take a liberal view of
the right of Native Americans to citizenship in Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 110-23
(1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
302. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 732.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol12/iss4/11
HeinOnline -- 12 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1014 1995-1996

42

Maltz: Only Partially Color-blind: John Marshall Harlan's View of the C

1996]

HARLANS VIEW OF RACE AND THE CONSTrrUTION

1015

alone in advocating stronger protection for the rights of free
blacks. By contrast, he was the only Justice to join both the
majority in Fong Yue Ting and the dissent in Wong Kim Ark.
Moreover, Harlan took a consistently anti-Chinese position on
other constitutional issues that came to the Court. 3 3 In short,
Harlan seems to have had little sympathy for the plight of
Chinese people seeking to either enter or remain in America.
CONCLUSION-THE HARLAN MYTH AND ITS
LESSONS FOR LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

A number of different lessons emerge from a close examination
of Harlan's record on issues related to the rights of AfricanAmerican, Native-American, and Chinese people. This record
demonstrates that modern commentators have often overstated
Harlan's distaste for race-based classifications. First, if one were
to identify a dominant theme in Harlan's race-related
jurisprudence, it would be support for a relatively broad
conception of federal power in a wide variety of contexts. Second,
his sympathy for the situation of free blacks should be
characterized as no more than that-sympathy for free blacks
specifically. Finally, even in this context, Harlan's view was
limited to a particular conception of fundamental rights. In short,
in Harlan's view, the Constitution was only partially color-blind.
Even more importantly, the pattern of Harlan's votes in the
Indian and Chinese cases illustrates the inadequacy of a model
that treats racial minorities in America as a homogeneous group
whose experiences and treatment has been analogous to that of
free blacks. Obviously, minority races have shared a substantial
common experience of racism in America. However, the example
of the development of legal doctrines dealing with the Chinese in
particular belies the premise of minority homogeneity. Harlan's
record on these issues exemplifies the degree to which a single
Justice might have different attitudes toward the plight of
different minority races.0 4
303. See, e.g., United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905); Lem Moon Sing v.
United States, 158 U.S. 538 (1895).
304. The behavior of two of Harlan's colleagues-Stephen Field and David Brewerreflected precisely the opposite pattern. Field consistently opposed the interests of
African-Americans, even dissenting in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 349-71
(1879) (Field, J., dissenting), but was the only Justice to support the Chinese in
Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 701-07 (1887) (Field, J., dissenting), Fong Yue Ting
v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 744-61 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting), and United
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Moreover, the special obstacles faced by minorities other than
African-Americans has had a substantial impact on the overall
development of the law. Yick Wo is a landmark by any standard,
and the doctrines developed in the immigration cases from the
Chinese Exclusion Cases to Fong Yue Ting and Wong Wing
continue to be a powerful influence on the structure of modern
immigration law. Yet all these cases were in some measure
a
reaction to the unique plight of the Chinese in American society.
Ultimately, the lesson to be learned is that an adequate
understanding of the development of the legal system cannot not
be based on a simple, bipolar view of American society-whites
on one side, minority races on the other. Such a view drastically
understates the complexity of the history of race relations in
America. Moreover, in the case of non-African-American
minorities, it further marginalizes the experience of groups that
have historically been faced with enormous hostility from
mainstream American society.

States v. Wong Kim Ark., 169 U.S. 649 (1897). Similarly, Brewer showed no
sympathy for African-Americans. See, e.g., Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45
(1908) (holding that state may require private schools that are administered by
corporations to be segregated); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906)
(prohibiting Congress from constitutionally prohibiting private interferences with basic
rights); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that states may require
railroads to be segregated). However, Justice Brewer was the most persistent
supporter of Chinese rights in the 1890s and early 1900s. See, e.g., United States v.
Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 264-80 (1905) (Brewer, J., dissenting); United States v. Sing
Tuck, 194 U.S. 161, 170-82 (1904) (Brewer, J., dissenting); Chin Ying v. United
States, 186 U.S. 202 (1902) (Brewer, J., dissenting); Lem Moon Sing v. United States,
158 U.S. 538, 550 (1895) (Brewer, J., dissenting); Quock Ting v. United States, 140
U.S. 417, 422-24 (1891) (Brewer, J., dissenting).
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